Different Paths to Democracy in the MENA Region:

A Configurational Comparative Analysis

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Working Papers Series

2017

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Abstract:

Democratization is one of the main political challenges in the Middle East and North Africa(MENA). The resistance to democracy and the presence of non-democratic regimes, remain an attractive area for academics and professionals to examine it. The purpose of this paper is to find out what factors and conditions explain the level of (non)democratization in the MENA. It examines whether there are different paths or specific factors that can influence the democratization process in the region. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method is used to find out the combinations of sufficient and necessary conditions for a particular outcomes (non-)democratization. The findings show that democratization is a multi-causal process. It demonstrate that different factors (e.g economic, societal, cultural diversity) have different impacts on the breakdown of democracy, democratic stability and democratic transition. QCA results highlight that the impact of various factors depends on their different combination within a country or groups of countries; showing that the Muslim population, oil export, regime type, political globalization, religious fractionalization and political parties as key factors in different configurations.

Key words: Democratization, Middle East, Democracy, QCA

Introduction

In the past three decades, democracy and democratization has been a prominent phenomenon in the political science and international relations. It has played an essential role in shaping the main events, organization state's relations, and regime types since the last century.

Democracy and democratization is one of the most debated topic in the current time, particularly in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). This is very clear in the face of the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the time when the calls for democracy became resonant. However, the calls ended with a new failed state (Libya), a brutal civil war (Syria), and unstable countries (Egypt and Yemen). Democracy and democratization has also strengthened radicals and anti-democracy's terrorist groups including Daesh (ISIS). Each of the affected countries has a very unique historical, societal, and economic developments. The protests that swapped the Arab World, asking for freedom and social justice, took the world by surprise, and despite that, many of the countries in the Arab gulf have been immuned to such protests, even the nondemocratic ones that rank very low in democracy and freedom indices.

In the last decades, researchers have examined democracy and democratization extensively, contributing to the ongoing debate. The more theories and studies emerged, the more debate and little agreement were derived on the conclusions. As Coppedge argues, although the democratization researchers have done great work, they have not reached consensus and conclusive points.[1] Coppedge also insists that the findings of the democratization researchers usually downplay their research themselves, which affects the findings and increases what appears to be a perfect and complete conclusion. "Authors, understandably enough, tend to downplay the limitations of their own findings. This leaves the impression that our knowledge is more complete and certain than it really is."[2]

For a very long time, the Middle East has been studied as part of the conflict and peace literature that focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil and economies of oil, and the occupation of Palestine. Meanwhile, very few studies have focused on the Arab World and democracy. The available studies have highlighted a single country or a global level at which the Arab world forms one small part of it. Posusney argues that most of the studies that examined democracy and democratization in the Middle East have focused on cultural and economical factors, which upon identification, were used to test other theories and elaborate on previous findings and conclusions.[3]

This paper aims to study the democratization and transition in the MENA region from a comparative perspective using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) technique. It particularly attempts to answer two main questions: (1) What are the necessary conditions to democratization in the MENA? And (2) under which conditions the transition to democracy can succeed in the MENA? Nevertheless, a third sub question can be answered: Does oil affect democratization or hinder democracy?

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[1] Michael Coppedge, *Democratization and Research Methods* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 127–38.

The paper reviews the existing literature to analyze the most important theories and literature on the field. This paper will focus on finding the most important conditions that explain the democratization and transition in this region. It will try to find out if there are different factors and causes, at both countries and regional levels, that influence democratization. It will also (1) study the survival of the different regimes in the region and (2) examine the downturns and upturns of the regimes on democratization.

This paper contributes to the democratization research and Middle East studies in two areas:

- First, most of the literature that examines the democratization in the Middle East focuses on the cultural, religious (the never-ended questions whether Islam is compatible with democracy) and economical factors. However, research shows that many other factors can influence democratization in different regions in the world. Bellin emphasizes the fact that there are no universal factors or conditions for democracy.[4] In the case of the present study, it examines democratization through a comparative perspective; it studies democratization from a few dimensions that reflect the most important conditions in which democracy is found to be flourishing, such as economy, state's institutions, culture, and legitimacy of the leadership. Examining democratization using a combination of conditions will constitute a new way of studying the process of democracy in the Middle East; it could reflect whether oil affects the democratization process (absence vs. presence).
- Second, Bellin argues that some of the historical conditions needed in some regions for democratic transition may contribute negatively in other countries.[5] The combination or sets of factors may hinder democracy. This paper examines some of these factors using the QCA method to uncover the combination of conditions.

QCA is an analysis method that is based on Boolean logic. It associates a set of explanatory conditions (independent variables) with outcome (dependent variable) through a set of factors. QCA is suitable for social phenomena or theories that are explainable by multiple causal paths.[6] In such models, we assume different countries have different paths for the outcome.[7]

Democratization

Democratization is the process of transformation of regimes, mainly authoritarian regimes, to democratic ones. Coppedge refers to democratization as the process that includes any process contributing to a democracy process, such as becoming more democratic, or the survival or break down of democracy.[8] Huntington refers to democratization as a three-serial process that consists of end of the authoritarian regime, installation, and consolidation of the democratic regime.[9]

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[4] Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East in Comparative Exceptionalism Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004):139–57.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Charles C. Ragin, "The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies," *Social Forces* 67, no. 3 (1987): 827-829.

[7] Michael Coppedge, *Democratization and Research Methods* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

There are also other types of nondemocratic regimes. Linz and Stepan differentiate the categorization of regimes based on the four following elements: pluralism, ideology, mobilization capacity, and leadership.[10] On the basis of this classification, they categorized regimes as authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and sultanism.

Huntington noted that there have been three waves of democratization, each of which is defined within a specific set of period.[11] However, the democratization waves were not linear as some of the countries at different waves of democratization did not become democratic. As Huntington argues, the first wave started in 1828 and lasted until 1926. The second wave started after the World War II and was followed by a short wave of swing from democratization. The third wave started after the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974.

Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in 1974, there has been an increasing interest in democratization and a large body of theoretical and empirical research and diverse methodology have been developed. A vast set of different potential explanatory factors are mentioned as determinants of democratization. Among these factors economic determinants have received most attention within the democratization literature. These studies argue that high GDP per capita increases the probability of a country being democratic (Lipset 1959; Diamond 1992; Arat 1991; Hadenius 1992; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003; Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2006). Some of the literature (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Ross 2001) focuses on the income from natural resources such as oil etc. explaining how this income may affect political institutions differently. They in particular focus on the impact of these resources on the stabilization of dictator regimes and systems asserting that they reduce the potential for transition to democracy.[12] Moreover, the modernization literature argues that economic development leads to a high level of education which increases the capacity and desire of citizens for participation in democracy (Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1992). Industrialization is another consequence of modernization and economic development, which can have a positive impact on democratization. Industrialization leads to social differentiation and pluralism through the transformation of the society from agrarian to manufacturing and trade one.[13]

Some of the literature focuses on non-economic factors such as cultural, social and institutional factors. Some scholars (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart and Welzel 2006) emphasize on specific values and culture traits as important conditions for the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, these studies associate cultures and values with religion and geographic region such as Islamic countries and culture are less compatible with democracy,[14] Protestantism is more favorable with democracy than Catholicism

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[10] Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* 38–54.

[11] Huntington, *The Third Wave*.

[12] H. Hegre, C.H. Knutsen, and E.G. Rød, "The Determinants of Democracy: A Sensitivity Analysis," *University of Oslo, Centre for the St udy of Civil War, PRIO* (2012).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

(see, e.g. Lipset and Lakin 2004) and "Asian Values" are not in harmony with democracy because they are often linked to Confucianism and promote hierarchical and authoritarianism.[15] Social cleavage such as ethnic, religious, linguistic and racial conflicts are other factors that their impact on democratization is emphasized by some scholars. Coppedge argues that the social cleavages are mostly non-negotiable and finally end in violence and lead to regime break-down.[16] Based on this argument, some scholars stress that homogeneous societies are more favorable for democracy. But Lipset distinguishes between overlapping and cross-cutting social cleavages: when overlapping, they threaten to become a source of political tension, which is less so when they are crosscutting.[17] Moreover, Lijphart argues that social cleavages can be managed to support democratic survival by the establishment of certain political institutions such as federalism and grand coalitions.[18] Finally, political-institutional variables related to regime types having different constitutional and institutional characters may affect democratization differently (e.g. Linz 1990; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cheibub 2007; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). For instance, Levine emphasizes institutionalized political parties,[19] Lijphart focuses on the separation of powers through decentralization[20] and Eva Bellin asserts institutionalized militaries as important factors favoring democratization.[21]

But part of the literature focuses on separation between different phases and stages of democratization that can be categorized in three groups: democratic transition, democratic stability and democratic quality.[22] The research on democratic transition focuses on the Schumpeterian approach to democracy, which emphasizes competitive elections and procedures regulating access to political power. Most of these studies compare regions with each other such as the study of transition in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s by O`Donnell et al.[23] Haggard and Kaufmann compare Latin America with East and Southeast Asia in a cross-regional analysis,[24] and Linz and Stepan compare southern Europe and Latin America with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.[25] One of the most interesting findings of these studies is that wealth does not necessarily lead to democratization. This

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[15] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).

[16] Coppedge, *Democratization and Research methods*(Cambridge University Press*, 2012)*.

[17] Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction, pp. 1–67, in: S.M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. New York: Free Press.

[18] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[19] Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[20] Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 243-257.

[21] Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East in Comparative Exceptionalism Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004):139–57.

[22] Gerardo L. Munck, "Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges," in *Democratization: The State of the Art*. *The World of Political Science*, ed. Dirk Berg-Schlosser (Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 2007).

[23] Guillermo O`Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[24] Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[25] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* 38–54.

challenges the modernization argument, which emphasizes economic development as an important factor for transition to democracy.[26] In general, the findings show the impact of different factors on transition in these diverse regions of the world such as elite and mass strategies,[27] state and prior type of government (Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997), colonial history,[28] regional diffusion,[29] membership of international organizations,[30] and classes such as bourgeoisie[31] and middle class[32] or labour.[33]

The second category of democratization literature focuses on democratic stability and democratic breakdown. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (2000, 2002) show that the breakdown of democracy has become a widespread phenomenon. The findings show that different factors influence democracy consolidation such as neighboring countries, regional and global contexts (see Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2007), impact of the old regime and modality of transition to democracy (Karl 1990; Karl and schmitter 1991), sequencing of economic and political reforms, economic performance and crises,[34] the strength of civil society and political parties (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), and regime types such as presidential or parliamentary.[35] Other scholars (Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; Diamond et al. 1995) show that democratic stability is less likely in plural societies or multinational states; but Lijphart argues that this problem can be eliminated by power sharing and the establishment of certain political institutions such as federalism and grand coalitions.[36] Moreover, Przeworsk[37] and Boix show that equality leads to class compromise and, consequently, to the stability of democracy.[38] These findings reveal that there is a difference between the causes and factors of transition

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[26] Adam Przeworski and Ferdinand Limongi, "Modernisation: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (1997): 155-183.

[27] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[28] Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[29] Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, "Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463-489.

[30] Jon Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[31] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[32] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960).

[33] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[34] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[35] Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference," in *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-87.

[36] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
[37] Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy, Studies in Marxism and Social Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[38] Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

of democracy and those that account for the stability of democracy (Rustow 1970, O`Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 65-66).

The third category of literature on democratization refers to the quality of democracy, which is at its early stages of development in comparison to democracy transition and stability. The research in this field differs from that of democracy transition and democracy stability, which are based on electoral democracy and the Schumpeterian concept of democracy. Dahl`s concept of democracy is the theoretical basis for most of the research in this field, which focuses on the election of a government in free and fair competitive elections, political equality and participation, and the process of decision-making and implementation of decisions that must reflect and depend on voters` preferences.[39] But there is no consensus about how to conceptualize, measure regimes and compare them through time and across countries. This led to the emergence of different cross-national indices such as Freedom House, Polity etc., which may produce divergent findings in empirical world.[40]

Democratization in the Middle East

One of the oldest explanations of democracy is the democratic political culture, which can be traced to Tocqueville who studied democracy in North America from cultural and religious perspectives.[41] Tocqueville stressed the concept of equality and argued that religion is one of the most important cultural elements in favoring democracy. His view has been shared among other scholars such as Max Weber, Lipset, and Huntington. Weber argues that Protestantism leads to capitalism, which is a crucial element for democracy.[42] Huntington argues that there is a big difference between religions in favoring democracy. Some scholars have argued that Islam is an undemocratic religion and does not accept democracy, but these views are based on the acts and traditions of the Middle Eastern communities and not on the basis of religions doctrines.[43] The elements of the Arabic culture and patriarchal-tribal mentality are the obstacle towards pluralistic and democratic societies.[44]

Another element is economy. Many scholars have asserted that economic equality and standard of living are prerequisite for democracy to flourish in any society. Most of the theories that connect economic factors to democracy argue that high living standards and economic equality will lead to new social actors who will seek social and political change. Moore et al., for example, argue, "No bourgeoisie, no democracy,"[45] and Rueschemeyer et al. argue that democracy needs a working class and not a middle

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[39] Gerardo L. Munck, "Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges," in *Democratization: The State of the Art. The World of Political Science,* ed. Dirk Berg-Schlosser (Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 2007), 65-66.

[40] Michael Coppedge et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 2 (2011): 247-267.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Richard F. Hamilton, "Max Webers The Protestant Ethic: A Commentary on the Thesis and on Its Reception in the Academic Community," in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* ed. R. Swedberg (2009), 180–205.

[43] Bernard Lewis, "What Went Wrong," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (2002): 43.

[44] Annika Rabo and Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[45] Barrington Moore, Edward Friedman, and James C. Scott, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993).

class.[46] At the same time, Coppedge argues that economy is not always a necessary factor because there are some democratic countries with elitist and non-egalitarian economies.[47]

The next important element on fostering democracy is political institutions. This element focuses on how the political structure of the country is designed, whether there is a multi-party system, and if the main powers are separated from each other. As Lijphart argues, federalism, constitutionalism, and separation of power are important elements in democratization.[48] In the MENA region, there is almost an absence of political parties in many of the countries in the monarchies of the GULF, and some countries have faced a cracked down of opposition parties who monopolized the political sphere of the countries and transferred the country into a competitive authoritarian regime.

A final important element that facilitates a democratization process is international intervention. A few theories focus on international intervention in the process of democratization. Pevehouse argues that international organizations such as NATO and EU require member states to democratize its institutions.[49] Other countries have funded civil society organizations and provided conditional aid to the targeted countries to promote democracy.[50] In the MENA region, there have been two faces of such intervention. In some countries, there was zero intervention in supporting oppositions, funding civil society, or criticizing government such as the gulf countries. Bellin attributes the maintenance of Middle East authoritarianism to Western foreign policy, the purpose being to ensure stable oil supply and contain Islamic threat.[51] On the other side, Western countries have criticized few non-oil rich countries after the Arab Spring. For instance, western countries have called a few leaders to step down, including former Egypt's president, Mubarak, former Libyan dictator, Qaddafi, and former Yemeni president, Ali Saleh. Yet these leaders were sustaining their leadership position in the face of what is called the Islamic threat. At the same time, all western countries were silent against the crack down and great violations of human rights in Bahrain and other oil-rich countries.

Despite the absence of consensus among political scientists and Middle East experts on the type of regimes in the Middle East, most have agreed on the existence of non-democratic regimes. Many scholars have denoted the regimes as "authoritarian," which Linz defines as a political system that lacks pluralism[52] because power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people:

> Political systems with limited, none responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate
> and guiding ideology but distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive

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[46] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[47] Coppedge, *Democratization and Research Methods.*

[48] Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (2004): 96–109.

[49] J.C. Pevehouse, "Democracy from Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2000).

[50] Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 59–73.

[51] Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism, 139–57.

[52] Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964).

political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercise power with formally ill-defined limits but quiet predictable ones.[53]

In the Middle East, there are different types of regimes. Some of them are kingdoms in which one-person controls all powers. In some other countries, military officers are ruling while in others, a single-party controls the state. Geddes classifies authoritarian regimes into (1) military, (2) single personalist, (3) single party or a combination of them.[54] Besides that, the Middle East has a long history of military-controlled states. Since the independence in the mid-1900s, military has controlled most of Middle Eastern countries. The military has played a major role in shaping the current state of the MENA countries. The Egyptian army ended the monarchy in the beginning of the first half of the last century; the Iraqi military did the same and exerted power over the political institutes for a very long time; and the same scenario happened in Syria.

Amos Perlamutter differentiates between two different military influences over the states in the Middle East. He argues that in a military ruler regime, the military controls the political decision directly, whereas in a military arbitrator they have indirect influence on politics.[55] In the Middle East, the military usually have influence on politics indirectly, which makes them more a military arbitrator regime than a military ruler. This is very clear in the wake of Egypt 2013 coup d'état where the military took over the country and paved the way toward its general to move to politics, exercising great power on the state's institutions. Yemen has traditionally a military ruler, which for long time was officer Ali Abdallah Saleh and followed by the current former army officer Hadi Mansour.

Other important elements that distinguish Kamrava' categorization of regimes in the Middle East are autocratic regime, tribal dependent monarchies, and regimes with dual military.[56] In the first type, (1) the president is either from the military or that (2) the military have a great power and influence on the president hence can veto national decisions. Egypt is an example of the first type of regime. In the second type, the monarchies rely on armies that are loyal to the tribe. In a big monarchy like Saudi Arabia, the military is derived from the big and loyal tribes of the country, whereas in small monarchies such as Qatar and Bahrain, the country depends mostly on foreign soldiers.[57] The third type includes countries where ideology replaces tribal loyalty as the foundation for the army structure. Ideologically-based militias are present parallel to the forma military; volunteers and partisan militias operate within the country as an independent military apparatus. Iran, Iraq (under Saddam Houssein), and Libya (under Qaddafi) are examples of this type of regime.

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Barabara Geddes, *Authoritarian Breakdown* (Los Angeles: 2004).

[55] Perlmutter Amos, *Political Roles and Military Rulers* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1981).

[56] Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil - Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1 (2000): 67–92.

[57] Lutterbeck Derek, *Arab Uprising and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance* (Geneva: 2011).

Much of the work on democratization in the Middle East is built on the concept of 'exceptionalism'. This approach argues that low level of democracy in this region relates to the fact that this region is internationally exceptional. The focus of these analysis is on cultural and structural characteristics of this region. The first analyses focus on the Middle Eastern culture and in particular on the Islamic culture. They argue that the Islamic belief system is based on divine principles, which are in contradiction with popular sovereignty and a political system based on majority votes.[58] But the counter-arguments challenge this approach arguing that the flexibility of Islamic religion provides a framework for variety of different interpretations, some of which are in accordance with liberal parliamentary institutions. Turkey and Malaysia are good examples for such liberal interpretations of Islamic religion.[59] The second type of these analysis emphasize on structural relationship between the state and social groupings. According to this approach the social groups in the Middle East are weak and dependent on state so that they can not play in role in changes towards democratization in these countries[60]. For instance, any change in the state structure can be seen as a threat to their interests by the bourgeoisie class because their interests are closely interlinked with that of state elites. The intelligentsia are also dependent on state and most of them are state employees. The industrial and work service are also dominated by the state.[61]

Considerable part of the literature on democratization in the Middle East focuses on economic factors and the relation between oil revenue and democratization. It sees oil exports as an obstacle to democracy. Many of the MENA countries especially in the Gulf countries, rely mainly on oil revenue with zero taxation, and thus politician and the states' institutions are not held accountable by their citizens. This is based on the concept of "rentier state" theory which argues that zero taxation in MENA oil revenue countries is the main reason behind the lack of democracy. It explains it through the need for accountability and participation in the process of decision making. As it goes, "No representation without taxation," and therefore, people are excluded from the decision-making process.[62] Other scholars reject this theory, arguing that Muslims and religious cleavages are the factors that hinder democratization in the MENA region.[63]

Researchers who focused on economy mostly examined oil-rich countries and the process of democratization. One of the main theories in this field is the "rentier state" theory, which underpins the perspectives in the previous studies on the basis that Middle Eastern countries are oil exporters hence rely on oil revenues. The rentier state theory argues that taxation is an important mechanism in the democratization process. Without taxation, the government will be financially independent, and thus will have no accountability measures in the face of the citizens. Moreover, wealthy governments will use the revenues to buy loyalties of the citizens as well as to spread nepotism and corruption. Through these

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[58]P.J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (Routledge, 1990).

[59] S. Bromley, "Middle East Exceptionalism–Myth or Reality," *Democratization* (1997): 321-344.

[60] Ibid

[61] Tim Niblock, "Democratization: a Theoretical and Practical Debate," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (1998): 221-233.

[62] H. Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (1987): 383-398

[63] J. Teorell and Axel Hadenius, "Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-N Evidence," in *Democratization: The State of the Art* (Opladen: Barbera Budrich, 2007).

means they aim at excluding citizens from participating in the decision-making process. Nevertheless in the Middle East, not all countries are oil-exporters; some rely on foreign aid or investment/labor exports to oil-rich countries.

Finally and most notably, one factor cannot explain the resistance of democratization process in this region. Bellin argues that a combination of factors can explain it.[64] This paper argues, as per Bellin's view, that democratization in the MENA region cannot be explained by one single factor, rather by different factors with different paths of causalities. For instance, resistance to democratization in Syria is totally different than the one in Yemen or Saudi Arabia. The historical, cultural and economical factors may have been of greater influence in some cases while have zero effect in others. It is also worthy to note that the element of tribal informal institutions in the Gulf countries, Jordan, and Iraq may have zero effect in Syrian, Lebanese, Tunisian, Algerian and Egyptian cases since they have different cultural societal structure. This paper builds on this literature and base on this argument to analyze the data in order to find the different paths to democratization in these countries.

In majority of the global and regional comparative studies on democratization, the most important factors identified were leadership, economy, culture, state and institutions, and external factors. These factors, according to Coppedge, are the most notable causes of democracy worldwide.[65]

Democracy measurements

There is no single definition of democracy at large other than the rule by the people, and this has been a lesson that political scientists and empiricists have acknowledged for some time. No consensus has been reached among empiricists on how to measure democracy or what are its measures. However, agreement was reached on seven key elements: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.[66] Combining these elements as the core components of democracy provides good measurements of indicators as follows:

1. The electoral value of democracy embodies the main element of rule by the people. The people elect their leaders in fair elections or tribal traditions through competition and hold them accountable for their actions and responsiveness to the people's needs.
2. The Liberal value of democracy aims at protecting individual and minority rights from majority. Strong formal institutions can do this.
3. The participatory value of democracy embodies the core values of citizens' participation in politics. This includes civil society organizations and all forms of indirect participation (non-electoral value).
4. The deliberative value focuses on how political decisions are taken on the basis of reasoning and debate in the community.
5. The egalitarian value depicts the material and immaterial inequalities in the political institutions. This includes inequalities in the use of formal politics and informal ones.

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[64] Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism,"139–57.
[65] Coppedge, *Democratization and Research*.
[66] Staffan I. Lindberg et al., "V-Dem: A New Way to Measure Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 159–69.

In other words, measuring democracy is variant from one study to another on the basis of the different understandings and phenomena of examination. The present study will use the available data and measurements from different datasets. despite the fact that the Middle Eastern countries have been studied empirically for a long time, their democracy's measurements are not very detailed and lacking in many aspects. Freedom House, Policy IV, and the recent V-Dem (not all MENA countries) have demonstrated the democracy states of these countries.

Table 1 shows the measurements of MENA countries before and after the Arab Spring. Acceding to these measurements, there has been some yet so little changes in the Middle Eastern countries. The main problem of such measurement is the lack of detailed measurement.

Table 1: Types of Middle Eastern Regimes and Democracy Ranking

Country	Policy IV[1]		Freedom House[2]		Regime Type (Cheibub et al.)[3]		Regime Type (Geddes et al.)[4]	
	1990	2015	1990	2015	1990	2008	1990	2010
Algeria	-2	2	4	5.5	Military	Civilian	Party-Military	Military
Bahrain	-10	-10	5.5	6.5	Royal	Royal		
Egypt	-6	-4	4.5	5.5	Military	Civilian	Party-Personal-Military	
Iran	-6	-7	5.5	6	Civilian	Military		
Iraq	-9	6	7	5.5	Civilian	Royal	Personal	Monarchy
Jordan	-4	-3	5	5.5	Royal	Royal	Monarchy	Monarchy
Kuwait	-66[5]	-7	7	5	Royal	Military	Monarchy	
Lebanon	-66	6	5.5	4.5	Civilian	Military		Personal
Libya	-7	0	7	6	Military	Royal	Personal	Monarchy
Morocco	-8	-4	4	4.5	Royal	Royal	Monarchy	Monarchy
Oman	-10	-8	6	5.5	Royal	Royal	Monarchy	
Qatar	-10	-10	6	5.5	Royal	Royal		Monarchy
Saudi Arabia	-10	-10	6.5	7	Royal	Military	Monarchy	Personal
Sudan	-7	-4	7	7	Military	Military	Personal	Party-Personal-Military
Syria	-9	-9	7	7	Military	Royal	Party-Personal-Military	Monarchy
Tunisia	-5	7	4.5	2	Military	Military	Party	Party
Turkey	9	3	3	3.5	Parliamentary	Parliamentary		
United Arab Emirates	-8	-8	5.5	6	Royal	Military	Monarchy	Party-Personal-Military
Yemen	-5	0	5.5	6.5	Military	Military	Personal	Personal

Note: [1]Polity IV: an average rating between -10 and -6 is generally considered "autocracies"; between -5 and +5 "anocracies"; and between +6 and +10 "democracies".

[2]It is a composite score of "Political Rights" and "Civil Liberties": an average rating of 1-2.5 is generally considered "Free"; 3-5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5-7 "Not Free".

[3]Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010: six fold regime classification.

[4]Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz (2013): types of autocratic governments 1946-2010.

[5]-66 Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."

Method

Developed by Ragin Charles, QCA gained recognition over the last two decades as a methodology in the social sciences.[67] In the recent decade, QCA has been rapidly developed and refined as a methodology in research design (Carstein and Claudius 2012; Rihoux and Marx 2013).

QCA is a tool for a systematic comparison of cases. It has elements of qualitative and quantitative methods, and it also asserts the importance of individual case studies. It emphasizes that the causality in social sciences is too complex and each phenomenon has more than one cause that interact with each other in a way that the different causes may produce the same outcome. QCA employs the logic of Boolean algebra to derive the combinations of sufficient and necessary conditions for certain outcome (in this case, democracy [less/high]).[68]

More specifically, the present study uses the csQCA, which is a case-oriented approach that is ideally suited for a small to medium number of cases. This method examines the specific conditions under which an outcome occurs and not the probability of average effect of a set of independent variables. The causal relations are indicated in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. In QCA, the analysis gives all the possible outcomes resulting from the combination of presence and absence of each condition. QCA builds on the idea that configurations can be sufficient and/or necessary, but the conditions can be neither necessary nor sufficient for an outcome. Necessary conditions must be present so the outcome can occur but their presence does not guarantee that the outcome will be present. A sufficient amount of fulfilled conditions always leads to the presence of the outcome, but the outcome can also occur in their absence. One of the key advantages of csQCA is that it allows for conjunctural causation, which means that a combination of conditions produce the outcome. CsQCA employs a set-theoretic approach in examining cause-effect relationships, that is, institutional configurations that lead to more democracy or not.[6970]

QCA uses Boolean algebra where operations such as "AND" and "Or" are used to represent important relation. "1" expresses the presence of the condition and "0" expresses its absence. The arrow symbol "$\rightarrow$" represents a connection between the independent variables and the depend variable, the outcome. QCA also indicates consistency and coverage. Consistency represents the extent to which a causal combination leads to an outcome. It also depicts the strength of the causal relation, calculated as the sum of the membership's scores that cases have to the intersection out of the sum of the scores of the alleged subsets.

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[67] B. Rihoux and C.C. Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques* (Sage, 2009).

[68] For more information on QCA(www.compasss.org)

[69] Ibid.

[70] Cardenas, J.. "Varieties of corporate networks: Network analysis and fsQCA", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 2012

$$\text{N. Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_iy_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(y_i)}$$

$$\text{S. Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_iy_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_i)}$$

Coverage represents how many cases with the outcome are represented by a particular causal condition. Coverage is calculated as the sum of the membership scores of the cases to the intersection out of the sum of the score to the alleged superset. It is important to keep in mind that QCA does not assume linearity of causation.

$$\text{N. Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_iy_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_i)}$$

$$\text{S. Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(x_iy_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{m}(y_i)}$$

Explanans and explanandum

The dependent variable of this study is democracy in the Middle Eastern countries. The data of the dependent variable were collected from two major sources: Freedom House and Polity IV. Polity IV is a combination of democracy score and autocracy score. Its scores range from -10 (which refers to monarchy) to +10 (which refer to consolidated democracy). It also categorizes regimes as autocracies, anocracies, and democracies. This measurement is based on political competition, executive constraints, and quality of executive recruitment.

The Freedom House index measures democracy based on two criteria: civil liberties and political rights. Political right includes elections, multiparty system, participation, and how the government is functioning. The civil liberties score measures freedom of expression, associational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy. The scores of this measurement range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating *most free* and 7, *most repressed*.

However, the two indicators (Polity IV and Freedom House), which measure democracy as a latent variable, have different ways of measuring democracy as well as measurement errors. On the basis that these two sources of data have biases, which can be eliminated by combining them,[71] this paper uses the combination of these variables provided by Freedom House.[72] The average of Freedom House is transformed to a scale 0−10 and combined with the Polity measurement, which is also transformed to the

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[71] Laurel E. Miller et al., *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), 13.

[72] Jan Teorell et al., *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset* (University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2016). http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan16

scale 0–10. Hadenius and Teorell show that this new score performs better in terms of validity and reliability than the two previous scores.[73][74] Moreover, the imputed version fills in the missing values of Polity with imputed values by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. It has a scale range from 0–10 where 0 is least democratic and 10, most democratic. In QCA, the country's level of democracy in 2014 is used to ascertain how some countries are more democratic than others. As we will use the csQCA model, the dependent variable will be dichotomized {0,1}. The dependent variable is referred as "DLEV"

The main hypothesis of the paper is that democratization in the Middle East has different paths. As emphasized by Bellin, the idea is that the degree of democracy level (high or low) depends on (1) the simultaneous realization and presence of a set of relevant factors and (2) the absence of a set of irrelevant factors within a country or a group of countries.[75] The relevance or irrelevance of factors is predicted according to the theories explained in the previous sections, whether in general the factor is seen as relevant for democracy or otherwise.

In other words, a country is more likely to achieve a higher level of democracy if it belongs to the set of countries characterized as follows:

- – not dominated by security issues
- – not dominated by Islamic tradition
- – low or not oil-producing
- – ethno-linguistically homogeneous
- – having strong international relationships and a more globalized economy
- – characterized by having a multiparty system.

Our strategy in the selection of conditions is a mixed bag of conditions derived from the main theoretical perspectives in the empirical literature on democratization in the middle east and at the global level. After reviewing the most relevant data from different datasets, these seven explanatory conditions are coded in this paper, which cover the four mentioned dimensions: culture, socio-economic, state and political institutions, and international factors. These dimensions are underpinned by theories that support the influence of the indicator on the level of democracy and democratization process as provided in the previous sections. In this study, the latest available updated values of these conditions for 2014 are used.

Below are the seven explanatory conditions coded in this paper:

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[73] Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39, no. 4 (2005): 87–106.

[74] Martinez I Coma, Ferran. "Turnout determinants in democracies and in non-democracies", Electoral Studies, 2016, PP 50-59

[75] Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism, 141-142.

Military Expenditure (MILEXP): This indicator measures the institutional dimension. Military expenditures reflect the security concerns and the influence of the army on policy making, especially the budget. It is measured by military expenditure in millions of US$ at current prices and exchange rates.[76]

Muslim Population (MUS): This indicator reflects the size of the Muslim population in any country. It is measured by the percentage of the Muslim population from the total population.[77]

Oil Revenue (OIL): As indicated in the previous section, oil production has been studied as a strong factor that hinders democracy and democratization. It is measured by the oil production value in 2014 dollars.[78]

Ethnic Heterogeneity (ETH): This indicator is measured by the probability that two strangers in the street do not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group.[79]

Economic Globalization (EG): "Economic globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments, and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates."[80]

Political Globalization (PG): "This indicator is measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945."[81]

Multiparty System (MUPA): This indicator measures the presence or absence of political parties. A score of 0 indicates no parties and 1 indicates multi-party.[82]

Given this operationalization, the starting hypothesis reads as the statement of sufficiency (1) bellow:

~OIL*MUPA*~MILEXP *~ETH*~MUS* EG* PG -> *Higher level of democracy*.

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[76] SIPRI Databases, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

[77] Rafael La Porta et al., "The Quality of Government," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15, no. 1 (1999): 222–79.

[78] Michael Ross and Paasha Mahdavi, 2015, "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2014", doi:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y, Harvard Dataverse, V2,

[79] P.G. Roeder, *Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985* (University of California San Diego, 2001).

[80] A. Dreher, "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization," *Applied Economics* 38, no. 10 (2006): 1091–1110.

[81] A. Dreher, "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization," *Applied Economics* 38, no. 10 (2006): 1091–1110.

[82] José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *Public Choice* 143, no. 1 (2010): 67–101; The World Factbook 2017. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2118.html#182.

The dots indicate the joint presence of the causal properties, and the headed arrow represents the sufficient causation of the joint to the outcome. The logical negation (~) indicates the absence of the condition "0". Table 2 contains the values of the conditions and outcome for 2014 used by this paper.

Table 2: Values of Conditions and Outcome 2014, Raw Data

CNAME	CABBREV	MILEXP	OIL	MUPA	ETH	MUS	EG	PG	DLEV
Algeria	DZA	9724.379972	51288493010	1	0.319999993	99.1	47.02	81.66	4.25
Bahrain	BHR	1475.265957	1788021972	0	0.550599992	95	87.37	48.01	0.41666666
Egypt	EGY	5085.120542	17279957254	1	0.163799942	81.8	46.5	92.46	2.75
Iran	IRN	9901.10517	1.17E+11	1	0.668799996	97.9	31.09	66.33	1.5833333
Iraq	IRQ	6921.269719	1.22E+11	1	0.548961043	95.8	48.31	54.61	4.8333335
Jordan	JOR	1548.873239	794610.4551	1	0.509175003	93	70.29	87.17	3
Kuwait	KWT	5832.249789	94578929839	0	0.708400011	95.1	63.98	61.05	2.4166665
Lebanon	LBN	2270.06596	0	1	0.779900014	37.4	73.3	59.67	6.083333
Libya	LBY	3755.658598	16975273988	1	0.15109998	98.1	67.16	50.75	3.3333333
Morocco	MAR	4048.610929	18059328.52	1	0.478699982	99.4	57.19	89.5	3.5833333
Oman	OMN	10951.36541	34077217550	0	0.439019978	98.9	81.02	45.74	1.75
Qatar	QAT	1876.758242	55638070005	0	0.7456	92.4	81.45	72.57	1.25
Saudi Arabia	SAU	80762.4	3.52E+11	0	0.55309999	98.8	63.35	62.01	0
Sudan (2012-)	SDN	2279.62164	9357106978	1	0.70797503	97	27.16	54.64	1.5
Syria	SYR	2494.887483	818458520.8	1	0.580600023	89.6	50.6	51.99	0.25
Tunisia	TUN	908.3572876	1988406114	1	0.03945595	99.4	60.22	86.02	8.416666
Turkey	TUR	17772.16775	1721820808	1	0.298503995	99.2	58.61	91.88	6.166667
United Arab Emirates	ARE	22755.07148	1.02E+11	0	0.737300038	94.9	88.06	55.33	1.3333333
Yemen	YEM	1714.830844	4518196584	1	0.078400016	97	45.08549	65.01	3.3333333
Thresholds		8228.31	90000000000	1	0.41	50	56.21	69.1	4

Note: some of these variables are taken from THE QOG STANDARD DATASET 2016, in addition the original source for each variable is also cited.[83]

However, most of these variables, which are called conditions and outcome in QCA terminology, are continuous (interval level) variables. To be used in csQCA, these values are dichotomized {0,1} by relevant thresholds indicated in the last row of Table 2, where 0 means "absence of the explanatory property" and 1 means "presence of the explanatory property."

We set the dichotomization thresholds as follows (see Table 3):

- DLEV: Democracy Level (2014): 0 if below 4; 1 if above.
- MILEXP: Military Expenditure: 0 if below 8228.31; 1 if above.
- OIL: Oil Production (value in 2014 dollars): 0 if below 90000000000; 1 if above.

[83] Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko, and Richard Svensson. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2016. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan16

- MUPA: Multiparty System: 0 if below 1; 1 if above.
- EG: Economic Globalization: 0 if below 56.21; 1 if above.
- ETH: Ethnic Heterogeneity: 0 if below 0.41; 1 if above.
- MUS: Muslim Population: 0 if below 50%; 1 if above.
- PG: Political Globalization: 0 if below 69.1; 1 if above.

Table 3: Conditions and Outcome 2014, Dichotomized Data

COUNTRY	MILEXP	OIL	MUPA	ETH	MUS	EG	PG	DLEV
DZA	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
BHR	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
EGY	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
IRN	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
IRQ	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
JOR	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
KWT	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
LBN	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
LBY	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
MAR	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
OMN	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
QAT	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
SAU	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
SDN	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
SYR	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
TUN	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
TUR	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
ARE	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
YEM	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

Note: for dichotomization of these variables the "Thresholdsetter" of TOSMANA software is used.

Analysis and Results

This paper uses fsQCA (3.0) software to perform the QCA analysis. The analysis points to the results that there is a need for combined conditions to have a higher level of democracy (outcome = 1). The connections between combinations of these causal conditions and the outcome can be identified through a truth table, which is a table of configurations – combination of conditions associated with the outcome. The truth table (Table 4) presents all the possible logical sets of conditions. There are sixteen configurations, which include one or more cases.

Table 4: Truth Table of the Boolean Configurations, High Democracy Level

MILEXP	OIL	MUPA	ETH	MUS	EG	PG	number	DLEV	cases	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	IRQ	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	LBN	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	DZA	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	TUN	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	TUR	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	SDN; SYR	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0	SAU; ARE	0	0	0
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	JOR; MAR	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	YEM	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	IRN	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	LBY	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	BHR	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	OMN	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	KWT	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	EGY	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	QAT	0	0	0

To minimize the truth table the fsQCA presents three solutions to the truth table analysis: (1) a complex solution - remainders (rows without cases) are not included in the minimization; (2) a parsimonious solution – remainders are included in the minimization; and (3) an intermediate solution – only those remainders are included in the minimization that are consistent with the researcher's theoretical and substantive knowledge.

Model: DLEV = f(MILEXP, OIL, MUPA, ETH, MUS, EG, PG)

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 1

                 raw   unique

	coverage	coverage	consistency
	----------	----------	----------
MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*MUS*PG	0.4	0.2	1
~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*MUS*EG*PG	0.4	0.2	1
~MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*ETH*~MUS*EG*~PG	0.2	0.2	1
~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA*ETH*MUS*~EG*~PG	0.2	0.2	1

solution coverage: 1

solution consistency: 1

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*MUS*PG: DZA (1,1), TUR (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*MUS*EG*PG: TUN (1,1), TUR (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*ETH*~MUS*EG*~PG: LBN (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA*ETH*MUS*~EG*~PG: IRQ (1,1)

This solution provides a larger number of casual conditions through a line for each separate path to the outcome, which are complicated solutions. According to this solution there are four pathways to high democracy level. The first configuration, corresponding to Algeria and Turkey, indicates that a multiparty system combined with a high military spending, not high oil-producing, ethnic homogeneous, large Muslim population, and a strong international P leads to a high level of democracy. This is fairly consistent at 1, and has a pretty good coverage 0.4.

The second pathway to a high level of democracy, corresponding to Tunisia and Turkey, is a combination of a multiparty system with not large oil-producing, ethnic homogeneous, large Muslim population, a more globalized economy and strong international relationships. This configuration is also fairly consistent at 1, and has a pretty good coverage 0.4.

The other two combinations of conditions linked to the outcome, high democracy level, are as follows: having a multiparty system combined with not high military spending, not large oil-producing, high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, not large Muslim population, a more globalized economy but not strong international relationships (Lebanon), and having a multiparty system combined with not high military spending, large oil-producing, high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, large Muslim population, not high globalized economy and not strong international relationships (Iraq). These pathways are also fairly consistent at 1 but less coverage, 0.2, than the previous pathways.

We can combine these four pathways using Boolean algebra

$$
MUPA* \begin{cases} MILEXP*{\sim}OIL*{\sim}ETH*MUS*PG \\ {\sim}OIL*{\sim}ETH*MUS*EG*PG \\ {\sim}MILEXP*{\sim}OIL*ETH*{\sim}MUS*EG*{\sim}PG \\ {\sim}MILEXP*OIL*ETH*MUS*{\sim}EG*{\sim}PG \end{cases}
$$

Overall the solution has a high consistency of 1 and a full coverage of 1. However, the solution has a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to a high level of democracy: MUPA (multiparty system). All pathways require MUPA, which indicates that its presence is necessary to achieve a high level of democracy.

Model: DLEV = f(MILEXP, OIL, MUPA, ETH, MUS, EG, PG)

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 1

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~ETH*EG*PG	0.4	0.2	1
MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA	0.4	0.2	1
~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA	0.2	0.2	1
MUPA*ETH*EG*~PG	0.2	0.2	1

solution coverage: 1

solution consistency: 1

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ETH*EG*PG: TUN (1,1), TUR (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA: DZA (1,1), TUR (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA: IRQ (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term MUPA*ETH*EG*~PG: LBN (1,1)

All remainder rows, which help to create a simpler solution, are included in the parsimonious solution. The reduced combinations are far simpler than the complex solutions. Again, there are four combinations of conditions linked to the outcome, high democracy level. In the first configuration (Tunisia and Turkey) strong international relationship is combined with high globalized economy and high ethnic heterogeneity, and in the second one (Algeria and Turkey) a multiparty system is combined with not high oil-producing and a high military spending. Both configurations have a fairly high consistency, 1, and a pretty good coverage of 0.4. These two pathways are also fairly consistent at 1 but less coverage, 0.2, than the previous pathways.

The other two combinations indicate that a multiparty system combined with high oil-producing and not high military spending (Iraq), and a multiparty system combined with ethnic homogeneous, a good globally integrated economy and not strong political international political leadership (Lebanon) are likely to lead to a high level of democracy.

Model: DLEV = f(MILEXP, OIL, MUPA, ETH, MUS, EG, PG)

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 1

Assumptions:

~MILEXP (absent)

~OIL (absent)

MUPA (present)

~ETH (absent)

~MUS (absent)

EG (present)

PG (present)

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA	0.2	0.2	1
MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*PG	0.4	0.2	1

~MILEXP*MUPA*ETH*~MUS*EG*~PG   0.2   0.2   1

~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*EG*PG   0.4   0.2   1

solution coverage: 1

solution consistency: 1

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~MILEXP*OIL*MUPA: IRQ (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term MILEXP*~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*PG: DZA (1,1), TUR (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~MILEXP*MUPA*ETH*~MUS*EG*~PG: LBN (1,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~OIL*MUPA*~ETH*EG*PG: TUN (1,1), TUR (1,1)

The intermediate solution includes only "easy" remainders, which are consistent with our theoretical and substantive knowledge. The software asks for the easy assumptions when it calculates the intermediate solutions; as it is shown in the above results we set our causal conditions to present/absence according to our theoretical perspectives and the empirical literature on democratization in the middle east and at the global level.

Again, the solution has four configurations. Overall, the solution has a consistency of 1 and very high coverage of 1. As with the complex solution, MUPA is a necessary condition to achieve a high level of democracy.

Findings and Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to explain democracy and democratization in the Middle East. Although many studies have associated different factors to democracy and democratization, there is a rarity of comparative studies that consider the cultural and religious factors, especially in the Middle East. This paper rejects the hypothesis that there is a single factor that can lead a country to become a democracy in definitive time; rather it argues that different factors explain how democracy can be achieved through different paths.

This paper discusses democratization in the region, considering the global and regional factors that have been studied and associated to democracy such as oil export, cultural factors, socioeconomic factors, and global economic and political participation.

The major finding is that democracy in the MENA region can be attributed to different paths and conditions. The results show that the high level of democracy in Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq is achieved through different combinations of conditions, some of which are country specific while others common in all cases. This means that a path may be relevant in a country or some countries but not in others.

Another important finding is that the complex and intermediate solutions show that a multiparty system is present in all pathways for all five countries (Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq). This indicates

that the presence of an effective multiparty system is a necessary condition (but not sufficient) to achieve a high level of democracy in the region.

Moreover, the results display that the effect of conditions on the outcome is context and conjuncture specific. These conditions are country-specific and must not be taken as factors that affect the whole region. In other words, a given factor does not have the same effect across all cases. For instance, while large oil-producing in Iraq combined with a multiparty system and not high military spending leads to a high level of democracy, on the contrary, in Algeria and Turkey not large oil-producing combined with a multiparty system and a large military spending is likely to lead to a high level of democracy.

This can be explained by the different nature of culture and history of the countries. For instance, in all configurations of Turkey the strong international relationship shows a positive effect. One possible reason is because Turkey may have been integrated within the international community, and thus the country has a good relationship with the European Union and is a member of NATO. This also implies that the strengthened relationship between Turkey and the European Union has led to the democratic consolidation in this country.

Another example, the Muslim majority tradition maybe a challenge for most MENA countries but not in Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria and Iraq. In Turkey, it might be because the tradition is combined with the parliamentary multiparty system and a global political participation. Another reason is that the dominant moderate Islamic culture and the secular interpretation of Islam in Turkey has already entered a phase of acceptance and stability, and thus the country has become in harmony with democracy and Western values.

These findings also suggest several courses of action for countries in this region. The countries in this region should try to find their own path to democracy by determining the democracy enhancing factors and the challenging ones. For example, strengthening the relationship between Turkey and the European Union can lead to more democratic consolidation in this country. In Egypt, certain factors can provide a good ground for democracy to flourish, such as reducing security and military intervention in politics and having a new secular interpretation of Islamic culture and tradition. Factors that are divisive, such ethnic and religious fractionalization, are less relevant for countries that are experiencing conflicts and a transition phase; the factors can even lead to regression or war such as in Syria, Yemen and Libya.

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Appendix I

Table 5: Operationalization of Variables and Data Sources

Variable	Abbreviation	Operationalization	Data Source

Muslim Population	MUS	Muslims as a percentage of the total population.	-La Porta et al. 1999 -2010 Pew Report
Oil Revenue	OIL	It measures the oil production value in 2014 dollars.	Ross 2015
Ethnic Heterogeneity	ETH	This indicator represents the ethno linguistic fractionalization. The indicator measures the probability that two random people in the street may not belong to the same ethno linguistic group.	Roeder 2001
Military expenditure	MILEXP	It measures military expenditure in millions of US$ at current prices and exchange rates	SIPRI Databases
Political Globalization	PG	"This indicator is measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945"	Dreher 2006
Economic Globalization	EG	"Economic globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments, and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates."	Dreher 2006
Multiparty System	MUPA	Recoded as: 0 no parties 1 Multiparty System	Cheibub et al. 2010; The World Factbook 2017

Note: most of these variables are taken from THE QOG STANDARD DATASET 2016, in addition the original source for each variable is also cited.[84]

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[84] Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko, and Richard Svensson. *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2016. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan16